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THE ILLUSIVE MEANING OF THE TERM
"PRODUCT" UNDER SECTION 402A OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
CHA, LEs E. CAru*

I. Introduction
When the American Law Institute' published their final draft2 of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965, 3 the resulting impact
had far-reaching effects. 4 The most noticeable effect was that strict liability,
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. LL.M., 1978, University of
Michigan, Fulbright Scholar; M.C.L., 1965, Southern Methodist University; J.D., 1964, St.
Mary's University; B.A., 1961, University of Texas.
The author wishes to express profound gratitude to his research assistants, Shanan T.
Bailey and Jeffrey R. Davis, without whose enthusiasm, dedication and hard work this article
could not have been written.
1. The individual members in 1965 were: Francis M. Bird, Esq., Professor Laurence H.
Eldredge, Professor James Fleming, Jr., Professor Robert E. Keeton, Dean W. Page Keeton,
Judge Calvert Magruder, Professor Wex Smathers Malone, Professor Allan H. McCoid, Dean
William L. Prosser, Dean Samuel D. Thurman, Jr., Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor, and Dean
John W. Wade. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS III-IV (1965).

2. See Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1964) (outlining
progress and development of § 402A). The original Restatement of Torts did not include a
provision imposing strict liability based upon a seller's implied warranty. Id. By the time the
Restatement (Second) of Torts was published in 1965, many courts were imposing strict liability
on the seller for injuries caused by defective goods regardless of the character of those goods.
In 1961, the first draft of the new § 402A limited strict liability to claims for "food for human
consumption." Putnam, 338 F.2d at 919 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)

(Tentative Draft 1961)). However, by 1962 another tentative draft of § 402A expanded the
coverage to "products intended for intimate bodily use" regardless of whether they have
nutritional value. Id. By 1964, the scope of § 402A was again broadened and adopted as the
final version which appears in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. For the full text of §
402A, see infra note 3.
3. Section 402A provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a)
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

4. Before the widespread adoption of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an
injured plaintiff would generally have to recover under a theory of negligence or contract
liability. See M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LLAItrrY § 1.1, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1988) (negligence
and contract liability precursor to strict tort liability). Under negligence and contract theories
of recovery, however, a defendant could escape liability if the plaintiff was not in privity with
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which had previously been applicable only to injuries resulting from dangerous activities5 and wild animals, 6 was accepted as a cause of action in

the defendant. See id. § 1.2, at 7 (privity requirement means by which manufacturer avoided
liability to indirect purchaser). As a response to such a harsh rule, courts created limited
exceptions to the privity requirement. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F.
865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1903) (summarizing privity exceptions). In Huset, the court enumerated
three established exceptions to the privity requirement:
[1] [A]n act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is imminently
dangerous to the life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the
preparation and sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human
life ....
[2] ... an owner's act of negligence which causes injury to one who is invited
by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's premises ....
[3] ... one who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently
dangerous to life or limb to another without notice of its qualities ....
Id. at 870-71.
Ultimately, courts abolished the privity requirement altogether. See MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) ("We have to put aside the notion that
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen,
grows out of the contract and nothing else."); see also McCormack v. Handscraft Co., 278
Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-500 (1967) (traditional privity limitation does not appeal to
sense of justice); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58-63 (1967) (discussing
evolution and policies involved in elimination of privity obstacle).
5. See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1948) (escape of lethal
gas into adjacent building); Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952, 953
(1928) (oil well blowout); Kall v. Caruthers, 211 P. 43, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922) (water allowed
to percolate); Colton v. Oderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 P. 395, 396 (1886) (blasting); Caporale v.
C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79, 175 A.2d 561, 562 (1961) (vibrations resulting
from piledriving operations); Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 336,
336 (1895) (seepage of inflammable liquids); Hannem v. Pence, 40 Minn. 127, 41 N.W. 657,
657 (1889) (construction of roof caused ice and snow to fall on ipasserby); French v. Center
Creek Powder Mfg. Co., 173 Mo. App. 220, 158 S.W. 723, 723 (1913) (explosion of powder
manufacturing plant); Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 54 Ohio St. 532, 44 N.E. 238, 238
(1896) (water collected in dangerous place); Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 830-31 (Okla.
1961) (crop dusting); Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280, 280 (1894)
(factory emitting phosphate gas). The policy of imposing strict liability for dangerous activities
is most often traced back to the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher, decided in 1868, in which
water stored in a reservoir on Mr. Ryland's property flooded the plaintiff's coal mines. See
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The English court held that
the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likcly to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril,
and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape.
Id. at 339-40.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts enumerates the law of strict liability for dangerous
activities which basically follows the Rylands rationale. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 519, 520 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Hays v. Miller, 150 Ala. 621, 43 So. 818, 819 (1907) (owner of wolf liable
for damages even without proof of negligence); Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564,
566 (1962) (absolute liability is well-settled rule for harboring wild animals); Briley v. Mitchell,
238 La. 551, 115 So. 2d 831, 854 (1959) (owner of wild deer liable for injuries caused regardless
of how deer escaped); Phillips v. Garner, 106 Miss. 828, 64 So. 735, 736 (1914) (owner of
monkey liable because notice of danger presumed); Molloy v. Starin, 191 N.Y. 21, 83 N.E.
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almost all cases involving defective products. 7 As a result, there was an
explosion of products liability litigation. 8 Suits involving strict liability for
defective products soon outnumbered all other tort cases.9
Naturally, the vast number of lawsuits caused some confusion. Courts
interpreted some terms of section 402A of the Restatement to include

588, 589 (1908) (owner of bear strictly liable, but common carrier who transported bear not
strictly liable); Moloney v. City of Colombus, 2 Ohio St. 2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1965)
(city zoo liable for injuries caused to patron by guano). See generally McNeely, A Footnote
on DangerousAnimals, 37 Micr. L. REv. 1181, 1181-1208 (1939) (discussing contrasting rules
of liability for wild animals). But see Hansen v. Brogan, 145 Mont. 224, 400 P.2d 265, 268
(1965) (negligence preferable to absolute liability where buffalo gored young child); King v.
Blue Mountain Forest Assoc., 100 N.H. 212, 123 A.2d 151, 155 (1956) (rejected adoption of
strict liability for injuries caused by wild boar).
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149, 150 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt); Bowles
v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin); B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1959) (automobile tire); Thompson v. Reedman, 199
F. Supp. 120, 121 (E.D. Penn. 1961) (automobile accelerator pedal); McQuaid v. Bridgeport
Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D. Conn. 1960) (insecticide spray); Hinton v. Republic
Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (airplane); Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869, 353 P.2d 575, 576 (1960) (grinding wheel); Jones
v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311, 313 (Ct. App.
1961) (beer bottle); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr.
823, 824 (1961) (club soda bottle); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602,
6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 321 (1960) (salk vaccine); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269
P.2d 413, 418 (1954) (hair dye); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69, 72 (1960) (automobile).
Generally, a plaintiff who is injured by a product will plead a claim not only for strict
products liability, but also for negligence and U.C.C. breach of warranty. See W. KEmBLE &
R. LaSHER, PRODUCTS Lxunrr § 11, at 17 (1979).
8. See Bivins, The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 11
AKRoN L. Rav. 595, 598 (1978) (products liability reform volatile area of law for many years).
The pivotal case which "burst the dam" of products liability litigation was the Michigan
Supreme Court case of Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply. See Putnam v.
Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 919 n.18 (5th Cir. 1964) (Prosser credits Spence with
opening the floodgate of products liability); see also Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supp., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873, 880 (1958) (no privity required to hold manufacturer
of cinder blocks liable).
9. While statistical findings vary from sample to sample, products liability suits outnumber
negligence and absolute liability lawsuits. See Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of
Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 32627 (1986). One sample taken in the United States District court system reports products liability
suits escalated from 1,579 in 1974 to 8,994 in 1982. Id. at 321 n.1. In 1976 the United States
Interagency Task Force on Products Liability estimated the number of products liability lawsuits
at between 60,000 and 70,000 and rising dramatically. See Hearing on Products Liability
Reform Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,Subcomm. on
the Consumer, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kasten), as reported in
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Legislative Analysis Publication:
FederalProducts Liability Proposals 1984, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1984); see also Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Alleged Contentiousand Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv.4, 69 (1983) (increase
in litigation caused by changing social conditions such as consumer's greater knowledge of
injury causation and awareness of technology available to prevent injury).
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individuals and events not originally mentioned, 10 while some terms, which
at first were thought to be clear and concise, proved quite illusive. One
such term is "product." If one is held strictly liable for placing a defective
"product" into the stream of commerce, or conversely, if one may escape
strict liability by showing that no "product" was introduced into the marketplace, it is imperative to define the meaning of this term." For purposes
of section 402A, courts generally reject the broad dictionary definition of
the term "product."' 2 Instead, courts use a policy-based approach to determine whether a particular transaction involves a product which deserves
section 402A protection. In some cases, as illustrated below, this has proven
to be a phantasmal objective.
II. Sales/Service Transactions
From the start, courts were adamant on two points. The first was that
strict liability was not tantamount to absolute liability.' 3 Defendants were
10. See, e.g., Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
A Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REv. 205 (1989/90) [hereinafter Cantu, Reflections]. The
author makes it clear that the apparent intent of the drafters of § 402A has been extended to
include events and individuals not mentioned in the original text. As a result § 402A should
now read: (1) One who places into the stream of commerce any product which is defective in
its manufacture, design, or marketing scheme and as such is in an unreasonably dangerous
condition to the user, consumer, or innocent bystander, or to that person's property is subject
to strict liability for physical harm and economic loss, and may be subject to liability for
punitive damages thereby caused to the ultimate user, consurmier, or innocent bystander, or to
that person's property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of placing such product into
the stream of commero-, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user, consumer, or
innocent bystander without substantial change. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies (a)
although the defendant has exercised all possible care in the manufacture, design, or marketing
scheme of the product, and (b) where there is total lack of privity between such parties. Id.
at 236.
11. The word "product" has several general definitions. The American Heritage Dictionary
defines a product as "[s]omething produced by human or mechanical effort or by a natural
process .... A dire:t result; consequence .... " AimEmc~A HERTrAOE DICToNARY 988 (2d
ed. 1982). Black's Law Dictionary defines product as "Ig]oods produced or manufactured,
either by natural means, by hand, or with tools, machinery, chemicals, or the like. Something
produced by physical labor or intellectual effort or something produced naturally or as a result
of natural process as by generation or growth." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (6th ed. 1990).
"Product" is also defined as "any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either
as an assembled whole or as a component part or parts, and produced for introduction into
trade or commerce." 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 3 (1984).
12. With regard to strict products liability, the courts have consistently rejected the dictionary definitions of "product" and instead use the policy reasons underlying strict liability.
E.g., Appleby v. Miller, 197 Ill.
App. 3d 533, 554 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1990); Papp v. Rocky
Mountain Oil & Minerals, 236 Mont. 330, 769 P.2d 1249, 1253 (1989); Jackson v. City of
Franklin, 51 Ohio App. 3d 51, 554 N.E.2d 932, 938 (1988). But cf. Kolpin v. Pioneer Power
& Light Co., 154 Wis. 2d 487, 453 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Ct. App. 1990) (product something
marketed, sold and used by consumer).
13. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913; Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829, 833 (1987);
Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, 719 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1986); Barrett v.
Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1176, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 310 (Ct. App. 1990); Vannoy v.
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not held liable simply because an injury had occurred; instead, liability was
imposed because injury was inflicted by a defective product. 14 Second, courts

made it clear that strict liability was applicable only to products." In other
words, only transactions involving chattels were included within the purview

of section 402A. Real estate transactions6 (discussed below) and the rendering

of services were not proper objectives.'
The reason for the rule that negligence, and not strict liability, is the
proper vehicle for recovery in a service transaction is that individuals practice

inexact sciences 17 and, therefore, should only be expected to act as reasonable
prudent persons.' Additionally, in a service transaction there is no "middle-

Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 726 P.2d 648, 679 (1985); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421
Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1984); Badai v. Teagu, 212 N.J. Super. 522, 515 A.2d 822,
824 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Marchese v. Warner Communication, 100 N.M. 313, 670
P.2d 113, 116 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981);
Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984); Ewen v. McLean Trucking
Co., 70 Or. App. 595, 689 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1984) (quoting Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)); Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 41 (R.I. 1989);
Jack Rouch - Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262, 275 (Tex. 1967); Baughn v. Honda
Mtr. Co., 197 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655, 662 (1986); Meunier v. Ogureck, 140 Wis. 2d
482, 412 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Johnson, 781 P.2d 922, 930 (Wyo.
1989).
14. See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 260,
221 Cal. Rptr. 447, 460 (1985); Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50, 525 N.E.2d 1305,
1314 (1988); Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Wilkerson
v. Porter Mach. Co., 237 N.J. Super. 282, 567 A.2d 598, 601 (Super. L. Div. 1989); White
v. Wyeth Labs, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E.2d 748, 751 (1988); Martin v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655, 664 n.14 (1983); Garcia v. Texas Instruments, 610
S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. 1980); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985).
See generally Brook, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions:A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575,
575 (1974); Phipps, When Does a "Sale" Become a "Service"?, INs. CoUNsEL J., July 1972,
at 274.
15. See, e.g., Tucson Indus. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936, 940 (1972); Greenway
v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 294 S.W.2d 541, 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Poppell v. Waters, 126
Ga. App. 385, 190 S.E.2d 815, 817 (1972). All jurisdictions, except New Jersey, limit the
applicability of § 402A to situations involving a product. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 97
Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584, 587 (1975); see also Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697, 705 (1969) (no sound reason for restricting strict liability to sales of goods). See
generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 679 (4th ed. 1971); Cantu, Reflections, supra note 10,
at 214.
16. See Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs. Eng'rs, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102
Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Ct. App. 1972); see also Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378,
1379 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (§ 402A has not been expanded to apply to service transactions); Sales,
The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 13, 13 (1978)
(strict liability not promulgated to encompass services).
17. See, e.g., Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 353 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (quoting City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn.
1978) (professionals exercise reasonable judgment in analyzing random factors incapable of
precise measurement); Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C. F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d
766, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (architect not strictly liable); Hoven v. Keble, 79 Wis. 2d 444,
256 N.W.2d 379, 385 (1977) (physicians do not practice exact science).
18. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954) (experts not
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man." Plaintiffs deal directly with the person responsible; therefore, no one
other than the provider should be judged. 19 Consequently, negligence, not
strict liability, is the proper cause of action. Finally, services are not massproduced, but rather they are rendered to the person requesting them;
therefore, the policy reasons for strict liability do not apply. 20 As a result,
efforts to extend strict liability to service transactions have failed in all
jurisdictions 2' except New Jersey.2

infallible, therefore, one can only expect reasonable care and competence); Burns v. Forsyth
County Hosp. Auth., 81 N.C. App. 556, 344 S.E.2d 839, 846 (1986) (healthcare provider held
to reasonable standard of care); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954)
(attorneys should exercise best judgment). This rule of reasonableness with respect to professional services has been consistently followed. See Allied Properties v. John A. Blume &
Assocs., Eng'rs, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972) (listing numerous cases
where court held professionals to reasonableness standard). See generally Sales, supra note 16,
at 18 (essence of service provider is performance of service with reasonable care); Wade, The
Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAMN. L. REv. 755, 760 (1959) (attorney liable only
for negligence).
19. See Sales, supra note 16, at 18 (service provider deals face-to-face with consumer). In
a service transaction, thl-re is no distributive chain upon which to spread the risk of injury.
Id. at 19. Risk distribution represents one of the fundamental underpinnings for the imposition
of strict liability against sellers. Id.; see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); Suvanda v. White Motor Co., 51 111 App.
2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313, 317 (Ct. App. 1965). See generally Brook, supra note 14, at 580
(discussing inability of risk distribution in service based transaction).
20. See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584, 588 (1975); Sales, supra
note 16, at 21.
21. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584, 587 (1975); Hoover v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76, 77 (1974); Cantu, Reflections, supra
note 10, at 214.
22. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). In Newmark, a beauty
parlor was sued for injuries resulting from the application of a permanent wave solution. Id.,
258 A.2d at 698. The product, marketed as a "Helene Curtis Candle Wave," was applied
with cotton as the plaintiff's hair was rolled section by section. Id., 258 A.2d at 699. Next, a
cream was placed along the plaintiff's hair line and covered with cotton. Thereafter, plaintiff
complained of a burning sensation along her scalp. After returning home, plaintiff's head
reddened and eventually her entire head was red and blistered. Almost a week later, the
plaintiff consulted her dermatologist, who diagnosed her condition as dermatitis. The doctor
concluded that her injury resulted from the wave solution. Id., 258 A.2d at 700.
The court explained the application of strict liability as:
One, who in the regular course of a business sells or applies a product (in the
sense of the sales-service hybrid transaction involved in the present case) which
is in such a dangerously defective condition as to cause physical harm to the
consumer-patron, is liable for the harm.
Id., 258 A.2d at 702 (emphasis added). The court adopted the approach that the "liability of
a manufacturer or retail seller of a product. should not be made to depend upon the intricacies
of the law of sales." Id. Instead, the application of strict liability hinges on whether the policy
reasons underlying the imposition of strict liability are satisfied. Id. Accordingly, the court
stated that:
A beauty parlor operator in soliciting patronage assures the public that he or
she possesses adequate knowledge and skill to do the things and to apply the
solution necessary to produce the permanent wave in the hair of the customer.
When a patron responds to the solicitation she does so confident that any product
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In some cases, however, it became clear that the distinction between
transactions involving the sale of a product and those involving the
rendering of a service was not clearly delineated. 23 Although little doubt
exists that traditional professionals such as doctors, 24 lawyers, 21 and architects,26 as well as nonprofessional providers, such as plumbers, 27 bar-

used in the shop has come from a reliable origin and can be trusted not to injure
her. She places herself in the hands of the operator relying upon his or her
expertise both in the selection of the products to be used on her and in the
method of using them. The ministrations and the products employed on her are
under the control and selection of the operator; the patron is a mere passive
recipient.
Id., 258 A.2d at 701.
In response to the application of strict liability to a service-predominated transaction, the
defendants claimed there was no distinction between the services rendered by a doctor or
dentist and those supplied by a beautician. Id., 258 A.2d at 702. Therefore, all three occupations
should be judged by the same principles. The court vehemently disagreed with this assertion
and in a lengthy diatribe espoused the differences between a physician and beautician. See
infra note 30.
Several years later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reiterated the rule that was handed
down by the Newmark case that strict liability could be imposed on service providers. See
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Co., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179, 186 (1982). In Michalko,
the supreme court stated that the arguments for imposing strict liability on the providers of
services are three-fold. Id., 451 A.2d at 186. First, the risk of harm from defective repair
services is great, and customers rely on the expertise of the providers of services as much as
they rely on the expertise of the providers of products. Second, there is no reason to believe
that providers of services are any less able to spread the cost of accidents than suppliers of
products. Third, imposing strict liability would induce providers of services to invest in safety,
leading to greater protection for the customers and reduced accident costs. Id.
23. See, e.g., Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 1986)
(applying Texas law) (analyzing problem of whether contract was for sale of goods or for sale
of services); T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Helicopter Serv., 540 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D. Ky.
1982) (claim under warranty theory against helicopter repairman for personal injuries dismissed
because transaction involved rendition of services to which sale of goods was only incidental);
Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal. App. 3d 493, 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 599 (1986)
(hospital only providing medical services and not in business of selling pacemakers); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dalton, 665 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (analyzing whether
roof installation involves sale or service). See generally Annotation, Applicability of UCC
Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Goods and Services 5 A.L.R. 4TH 501, 501 (1981)
(detailing numerous cases where court wrestled with distinctions between sales and services).
24. See, e.g., McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 (1976) (treating doctor provided services); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94
N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539, 540 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (dentist provides service;
therefore strict liability does not apply); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379,
385 (Wis. 1977) (strict liability does not apply to surgeons).
25. Cf. Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon Properties, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1558
(W.D. Okla. 1989) (lawyers not exposed to strict liability under securities statute).
26. See Chubb 'Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assoc., 656 S.W.2d 766, 780 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) (service exception to § 402A generally applies to architects).
27. See Slayton v. Wright, 27 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494, 505 (1969) (plumbing
contractor not strictly liable); see also Stevens-Salt Lake City, Inc. v. Wong, 123 Utah 309,
259 P.2d 586, 588 (1953) (strict liability not maintained on basis of leaking pipes). See generally
Powers, DistinguishingBetween Product and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L. REv. 415,
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bers, 28 and automobile repairmen, 29 provide services, there are other

situations where the distinction is somewhat mixedA0 For example, situations where the bargain involved air conditioning,3 ' electrical, 3 2 heat-

430 (1984) (strict liability not applicable to plumber-installed water heater that could have been
purchased elsewhere).
28. See Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342, 344 (C.P. 1963)
(beautician provides services); Payne v. Saft Sheen Prods., 486 A.2d 712, 717 (D.C. 1985)
(claim against beautician for strict liability was dismissed). But see Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,
94 N.J. Super. 228, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (beautician held strictly liable).
29. See Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76, 78 (1974) (strict
liability does not apply to auto repair shop); see also Powers, supra note 27, at 415.
30. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969) (court distinguishes professionals from non-professional providers). In Newmark, the court explained why
the same standard of liability should not be imposed on doctors and dentists as it is in New
Jersey on a beautician. See id. The court stated:
The beautician is engaged in a commercial enterprise; the dentist and doctor in
a profession. The former caters publicly not to a need but to a form of aesthetic
convenience or luxury, involving the rendition of nonprofessional services and
the application of products for which a charge is made. The dentist or doctor
does not and cannot advertise for patients; the demand for his services stems
from a felt necessity of the patient. In response to such a call the doctor, and
to a somewhat lessor degree the dentist, exercises his best judgment in diagnosing
the patient's alrment or disability, prescribing and sometimes furnishing medicines
or other methods of treatment which he believes, and in some measure hopes,
will relieve or cure the condition. His performance is not mechanical or routine
because each patient requires individual study and formulation of an informed
judgment as to the physical or mental disability or condition presented, and the
course of treatment needed. Neither medicine nor dentistry is an exact science;
there is no implied warranty of cure or relief. There is no representation of
infallibility and such professional men should not be held to such a degree of
perfection. There is no guaranty that the diagnosis is correct. Such men are not
producers or sellers of property in any reasonably acceptable sense of the term.
In a primary sense they furnish services in the form of an opinion of the patient's
condition based upon their experienced analysis of the objective and subjective
complaints, and in the form of recommended and, at times, personally administered medicines and treatment. Practitioners of such callings, licensed by the
State to practice after years of study and preparation, must be deemed to have
a special and essential role in our society ....
Thus their paramount function the essence of their function - ought to be regarded as furnishing of opinions
and services. Their unique status and the rendition of these sui generis services
bear such a necessary and intimate relationship to public health and welfare that
their obligation ought to be grounded and expressed in a duty to exercise
reasonable competence and care toward their patients. In our judgment, the
nature of the services, the utility of and the need for them, involving as they do,
the health and even survival of many people, are so important to the general
welfare as to outweigh in the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists
and doctors of the rules of strict liability in tort.
Id., 258 A.2d at 702-03 (citations omitted).
31. Compare Mingledorff's, Inc. v. Hicks, 133 Ga. App. 27, 209 S.E.2d 661, 662 (1974)
(installer of air conditioning system provides service) with B & B Refrigeration & AirConditioning Serv., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 635, 637 (D.C. 1978) (installation of
air conditioning system constitutes sale of goods).
32. Compare Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410, 222
N.W.2d 323, 324 (Ct. App. 1974) (electrical wiring installed constituted sale of goods) with
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ing, 33 or plumbing systems,3 4 concrete, 3 steel,36 swimming

floor

coverings3"

pools, 3

7

and

proved perplexing to the courts. Was the transaction

one involving the sale of a product or the rendering of a service? Was
the injury caused because the product was defective or because the service
rendered was faulty? These threshold questions were very important
because the applicability of section 402A depended upon the answer to
these questions.
'39
The dilemma was soon solved by applying the "predominant factor test."

This standard, which more often than not presents a question of fact for
the jury, 40 is easy to apply. It simply asks what was the predominant factor

Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., 258 N.W.2d 649, 652 (N.D. 1977) (discussing necessary
analysis to determine whether contract for electrical installation is for goods or services).
33. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 1977)
(discussing whether strict liability can apply to installation of heating system); see also State
Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 123 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Yates v.
Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967) (strict liability applied to home builder who defectively installed
water heater in home). In Hodges, the defendants were not only involved in installing the
heater, but they also sold it to the plaintiff. Hodges, 189 So. 2d at 123. This fact aided in
effectuating the policy reasons for imposing strict liability. Id.
In Victor v. Barzaleski, the court held that a handyman who merely installed a heating
system and did not make a sale was not liable under the UCC. Victor v. Barzaleski, I U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 104, 105 (Pa. 1959). Presumably, the contractor in Victor could not
have been liable under 402A because he only provided a service.
34. Accord Semler v. Knowling, 325 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 1982) (installation of sewer
pipes and fittings considered service predominated contract); see Cork Plumbing Co. v. Martin
Bloom Assocs., 573 S.W.2d 947, 958 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (plumbing construction contract
which included materials predominated by service). See generally Annotation, Applicability of
UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contractsfor Sale of Goods and Services, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 501, 508
(1981) (discussing numerous cases dealing with hybrid sales/service contracts).
35. See Port City Constr. Co. v. Henderson, 266 So. 2d 896, 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972)
(concrete provided in construction contract constituted sale of goods); S.J. Groves & Sons Co.
v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 528 (3d Cir. 1978) (contract for delivery of ready-mixed concrete
was sale of goods). But see R. C. Freeman v. Shannon Constr. Co., 560 S.W.2d 732, 737
(rex. Civ. App. 1977) (essence of contract between general contractor and subcontractor for
concrete was service).
36. See Belmont Indus. v. Bechtel Corp., 425 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (fabricated
structural steel constituted sale of product). But see United States v. Framen Steel Supply Co.,
435 F. Supp. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (contracts for supply of steel were financing agreements
not sale of goods).
37. Compare Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221, 1223 (C.P.
1975) (contract for installation of swimming pool predominately service) with Riffe v. Black,
548 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (installation of pool held to be sale of product).
38. Compare Colorado Carpet Installation Co. v. Palermo, 647 P.2d 686, 688 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982) (major component of contract price was cost of carpeting not installation labor
charge) with Peltz Constr. Co. v. Dunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (contract
not for sale of goods just because cost of materials included in price).
39. E.g., Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal. App. 3d 493, 225 Cal. Rptr.
595, 597 (1986) (essence of relationship hospital provides while installing pacemaker is professional services); Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ct. App. 1987) (car
wash supplier held strictly liable as product predominated service); Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954) (hospital provides requisite human skill
necessary to restore patient's health). See generally Cantu, Reflections, supra note 10, at 214.
40. See Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (issue
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of the transaction." If the injured plaintiff entered into the bargain because
he wished to purchase a product, as opposed to the associated service, the
transaction is considered to be for a product.
A good example would involve contact lenses. 42 When individuals are
tested, examined, and fitted with such lenses, the question arises whether
they purchased a product (the lenses) or whether they bargained for the
attending services. What induced the individual to enter into the bargain?
Would any lens suffice, or was the skill of the attending optometrist or
ophthalmologist the main reason for the bargain?
As a rule, if it is established that the defendant's knowledge, expertise,
or reputation was the prevailing reason for entering into the agreement, the
transaction will be deemed a service. 43 If, however, such proficiency was
incidental, the t:ransaction will be considered the sale of a product.4 After

of whether hospital govn which caught fire was essential to professional relationship presented
jury question).
41. See, e.g., Anthcny Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983) (predominant nature test should not be applied mechanically). The court in Sheehan argued that the
predominant factor test should be modified to a "gravamen" test. The court quoted Hawkland's
treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code where he wrote:
Unless uniformity would be impaired thereby, it might be more sensible and
facilitate admintration, at least in this grey area, to abandon the "predominant
factor" test and focus instead on whether the gravamen of the action involves
goods or services. For example, in Worrell v. Barnes, if the gas escaped because
of a defective fitting or connector, the case might be characterized as one involving
the sale of goods. On the other hand, if the gas escaped because of poor work
by Barnes the cese might be characterized as one involving services, outside the
scope of the U.C.C.
Id., 455 A.2d at 440 (quoting W. HAWvIu.-AD, UNIoFR COMMERCIAL CODE SmsaS art. 2, § 2102:04 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573, 574
(1971).
42. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 342 (Tex. 1968) (strict liability does not apply
to sale of contact lenses). The plaintiff in Barbee sued Rogers, who was doing business as
Texas State Optical, for improperly fitting the plaintiff with contact lenses. Id. at 343. The
plaintiff also alleged that he was given improper prescriptions and instructions for the use of
the contacts. After pointing out the statutory definition of the practice of optometry, the court
concluded that the defendant's business (i.e., optometry plus the sale of glasses) falls between
the distinction separating the practice of optometry and the merchandizing of retail goods. Id.
at 345. The court recognized that Texas State Optical had characteristics of both a professional
service and a merchandising concern. The court based its decision on the fact that there was
no evidence of a defect in the lenses themselves. Id. at 346. The court also pointed out that
the contact lenses were not a finished product which the general public was solicited to
purchase. Id.
This case signifies that whether or not a good is a product depends upon whether it was
completely assembled and available to the general public before sold to a consumer. This logic
is erroneous if applied to manufacturers who customize a product or operate on a zero
inventory make-to-order business. Surely, they should not be exempt from strict liability.
43. See Hector v. Ce.dars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal. App. 3d 493, 225 Cal. Rptr. 595,
599 (1986) (implantation of pacemaker involved in course of treatment not merely sale of
product); Easterly v. HSP of Texas, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (sale of
epidural kit "integrally related" to services performed).
44. See Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (hospital
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all, it would be fair to assume that if the principal reason for entering into
the bargain was the subject matter, the transaction concerns the sale of a
product. If not, the agreement must be viewed as one where a service was
rendered. In other words, if any lens would suffice, then the plaintiff clearly
entered into a sales transaction. If, however, the lenses were purchased as
a result of the accompanying service, the converse would be true. As stated
above, these questions are sometimes very complex. By definition 45 and
necessity, juries must provide the solution.
The answer to the initial sales/service dilemma will determine whether the
plaintiff's remedy will lie in negligence or strict liability. 4 If the transaction
is a service, strict liability is generally not available. 47 If the transaction
involves the sale of a product, strict liability is an available remedy. 4" In
hybrid situations, the dilemma rests upon the scope of the term "product."
III.

Real Estate Transaction

Nowhere is this dilemma better illustrated than in transactions involving
real estate. Historically, houses have never been considered a product. Land
and everything permanently attached thereto is considered real property, 49
and everything else is considered personal property. 0 If, therefore, one is
to assume that a "product" is synonymous with a chattel or personal
property, there would be little difficulty with a rule that section 402A never
applies to real estate. It seems obvious that because land is the antithesis
of personal property, strict liability would never be an issue when a house
is allegedly defective. In fact, however, the opposite is true.
The application of section 402A to the sale of a house occurred gradually.
In Humber v. Morton,5 the Texas Supreme Court took the first step toward
the rule that a house is a product by recognizing that the common law
warranties of good workmanship and habitability 2 were implied in the

gown involves sale of product). In Thomas, the plaintiff died after suffering from burns caused
when plaintiff dropped a lighted match and ignited his hospital gown. Id. at 793. In holding
that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a strict liability issue to the jury, the appellate
court stated: "Where, as here, a hospital apparently supplies a product unrelated to the
essential professional relationship, we hold that it cannot be said that as a matter of law the
hospital did not introduce the harmful product into the stream of commerce." Id. at 796-97.
45. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
49. BLAcK's LAW DICnONARY 1096 (5th ed. 1979).

50. See Bismarck Tribune Co. v. Omdahl, 147 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1966) (personal
property is property other than real property).
51. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
52. Id. at 555. By implying warranties from the sale of a home, the Texas Supreme Court
expressly abolished the long-standing doctrine of caveat emptor. Id. at 562.
The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently
out of harmony with modern home buying practices. It does a disservice not
only to the ordinary prudent purchaser but to the industry itself by lending
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contract for the sale of a new home. While the court in Humber did not
fully explain their holding with regards to implying these warranties, subsequent court decisions gave several reasons for this position. First, courts
recognized that the purchase of a new house is one of the most important
agreements that an individual will ever make.53 Buying a house is not an
everyday transaction; therefore, buyers are entitled to the protection offered
to them by these legal principles.14 In addition, the parties involved in this
type of contract do not share equal bargaining power.5 " Typically, the builder
has much more knowledge than the average home buyer.16 Furthermore,
because many defects in a house may be latent, or may go undetected to
even the most vigilant of purchasers, the buyer must rely heavily upon the
7
skill, knowledge, and expertise of the builder to provide a suitable abode.
Aside from this element of superior knowledge, the builder/vendor is also
in a much better position to prevent the occurrence of any major problems. 8
For these reasons, builders should warrant the suitability of their work.
Additionally, standard-form contracts are generally used in this type of
purchase, and because express warranties are seldom given, and almost
impossible to negotiate, the unsuspecting buyer is again forced to rely upon
the skills of the builder.5 9 Finally, the applicability of implied warranties to
the purchase of a house is further supported by the idea that contractors
hold themselves out as possessing the necessary expertise in building houses. 60
Buyers would never encounter a contractor averring to the contrary; consequently, home buyers expect good workmanlike skills and a habitable
home. 6' With such arguments, it was easy to extend the common law

encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of shoddy

work.
Id. Several early commentators agree with the imposition of implied warranties in the sale of
new homes. See, e.g., Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 651 (1965); Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Reality - Recent
Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541, 545-47 (1961); Dunham, Vendor's Obligation
as to Fitness of Land .for a ParticularPurpose, 37 MNN. L. Ray. 108, 112-13 (1953).
53. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979); accord Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55. 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279
(Wyo. 1975).
54. See McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1289.
55. Id.

56. See id. Most home buyers lack the skill and expertise to adequately inspect the house.
Weeks v. Slavick Builders, 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, 505, aff 'd, 384 Mich. 257,
181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); see also Note, Expansion of Consumer Protection in the Purchaseof
New Homes, 3 W. ST. U.L. Ray. 106, 109 (1975); Bearman, supra note 52, at 54546.
57. McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1289.
58. Id.
59. Id., 398 A.2d at 1290.
60. Id.
61. See Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Doctrine in Residential Property
Conveyances: Policy-Backed Change Proposals, 62 WAsH. L. REv. 743, 747 (1987) (buildervendor purposely create3 expectation of quality home). The builder-vendor creates not only an
expectation that the home is liveable but that the home is "truly wonderful." Id.; accord
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warranties of good workmanship and habitability, hybrids of tort and
contract, to the arena of real estate transactions. New home buyers, as well
as their subsequent purchasers, now have this protection, and as a result,
the traditional rule that implied warranties never arose in real estate transactions became a historical fact.

The first case to hold that new houses were products and that strict
liability under section 402A was applicable to defective houses was Schipper

v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.62 The court, faced with facts involving a sixteenmonth-old child with extensive injuries resulting from a defective water

heater, 63 reasoned that houses which are mass-produced are no different
from automobiles because both are the end product of an assembly line
technique. 64 Several policy considerations influenced the decision, but the
most cogent were reminiscent of those used to justify the applicability of
the common law warranties discussed above. The court specifically noted
the unequal bargaining positions of the parties, 65 the buyer's reliance upon

the skill, knowledge, and expertise of the contractor,"s the builder's ability

to spread the cost of liability, 67 and the corresponding inability of the buyers

to protect themselves from the risk of probable loss.s By allowing a cause
of action in strict liability, the court in Schipper established that a house
could be a product. Therefore, strict liability will apply to a house which
69
is proven defective and unreasonably dangerous.

Dixon v. Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. 1982) (sales person
represented home was "top-notch" and "'A' number one"). These representations by the
builder-vendor create, in effect, contract rights. Sloat v. Matheny, 44 Colo. App. 1, 625 P.2d
1031, 1033 (1981).
62. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
63. Id., 207 A.2d at 316. The child was severely scalded by hot water from a bathroom
faucet. Id. The heating system used to provide hot water for the house also served the purpose
of heating the house by pumping the hot water through coils imbedded in the cement foundation
of the house. Id., 207 A.2d at 316-17. The instructions that accompanied the heating system
acknowledged that the water was "hotter than that to which you are accustomed" and instructed
the homeowners to use the cold water tap to mix the water to an appropriate temperature.
Id., 207 A.2d at 317. Despite these instructions, members of the plaintiff's family were mildly
burned on several occasions. The only way to reduce the temperature of the water coming out
of the tap, other than using the cold water tap, was the installation of a mixing valve at the
heating system. Id.
64. Id., 207 A.2d at 326. "Buyers of mass produced development homes are not on equal
footing with the builder vendors and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than
are automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves in the bill of sale." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id., 207 A.2d at 325. With a mass-produced home, the buyer does not have an architect
or other professional advisor under his or her employ. Also, the buyer usually can do no
more than a superficial inspection of the home. Id.
67. Id., 207 A.2d at 326.
68. Id.
69. See id., 207 A.2d at 329-30. The court in Schipper found that the heating system itself
was not defective; therefore, the manufacturer could not be held strictly liable. Id., 207 A.2d
at 329. The defect arose as a result of improper installation of the heating system due to the
builder vendor's failure to install the mixing valve. Id.
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Interestingly, the Schipper decision, although refuted by some jurisdictions,70 has been followed 7' and even extended by some courts to apply to
the sale of custom homes.7 2 The underlying problem in all of these cases,
however, was the central question of whether or not a house is a product.
Neither section 402A nor the accompanying comments offer any clue in
answering this ques;tion. By necessity, therefore, in order to equate a house
to a product, the courts, in each case since Schipper, have had to examine
the rationale behind the applicability of section 402A.7 3 One of the considerations specifically mentioned has been the public's right to health and
safety. 74 It was this concern that originally encouraged the courts to hold a
manufacturer of defective goods strictly liable.7 5 If the product in question
proved defective, and if that defect caused injury, the concept of strict
liability applied. Therefore, it is logical to rely upon this same reasoning to
extend the concept of strict liability to real estate transactions.
The courts have also relied upon the above discussed reasons for extending
common lav warranties to the construction of houses when applying strict
liability to transactions involving real estate.76 These reasons include the
prospective buyer's inability to discover potential defects in the construction
of the house, 77 reliance upon the expertise, skill, and knowledge of the
70. E.g., McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1348 (D. Colo.
1980); K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group, Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D. Conn. 1980);
Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Ct. App. 1972); Green
v. Green Acres Constr. Co., 36 Colo. App. 439, 543 P.2d 108, 110 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975);
Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599, 602 (1977); Lowrie v. City of
Evanston, 50 Il1. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1977); Cree Coaches, Inc. v. Panel
Suppliers, 384 Mich. 646, 186 N.W.2d 335, 336 (1971); Queensbury Union Free School Dist.
v. Jim Walter Corp., 82 A.D.2d 204, 442 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 1981); Van Ornum
v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188, 201 (N.D. 1973); Cook v. Salishan Properties, 279
Or. 333, 569 P.2d 1033. 1035-36 (1977); Cox. V. Shaffer, 223 Pa. Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456,
457 (1973).
71. E.g., Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (1981); Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1969); Del Mar Beach
Club Owners Assoc. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886,
893 (1981); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664, 666
(Ct. App. 1977); O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn.
1977); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966); Hovenden v.
Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979); Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371,
1373 (Ct. App. 1972); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38,
240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1976).
72. See Pattitucci Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297, 298 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1977) (strict liability applicable to builder of custom homes); see also Cross & Murray, Liability
for Toxic Radon Gas in Residential Home Sales, 66 N.C.L. REv. 687, 706-07 (1988).
73. See Cross & Murray, supra note 71, at 705.
74. Id.; see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (Cal. 1963) (manufacturer strictly liable when defective product causes
personal injury).
75. See supra note 7.
76. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965) (principles
supporting warranty and strict liability carry over into real estate).
77. Id.
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contractor, 78 the ability of the builder to spread the cost of liability, 79 and,
of course, the mass production technique of the builder/vendors in the
construction of new houses. s0 The courts have also reasoned that houses
are the equivalent of a product because they enter the marketplace in the
condition intended by the contractor in much the same way as any other
produced goods.8 These decisions have all reached one common conclusion:
a house is a product. While this proposition may run counter to what we
may have originally learned, it carries a great deal of authority.12 However,
it is by no means a unanimous position.
Other jurisdictions, when faced with the exact same question, have arrived
at the opposite conclusion.8" These cases emphasized the fact that injured
plaintiffs involved in real estate transactions have more than adequate relief
offered to them by traditional tort and contract theories.14 As such, there
is no need to extend strict liability, and, therefore, it is not necessary to
reach the conclusion that a house is a product."5 In addition, these courts
have maintained that extending this concept would provide
a powerful cause
86
of action to individuals with somewhat dubious claims.
One of the original reasons for strict liability was to offer relief where
none was available and to discourage litigation where there was no cause
of action. Furthermore, allowing strict liability to apply to the sale of a
new home would preclude a defendant/contractor from asserting defenses
which have traditionally applied to the construction of houses.8 7 In other
words, the purchasing public, when buying a house, have never believed
that they were acquiring a perfect building. As such contractors should only
be held to the standard of the reasonable prudent person. These courts have
also reasoned that to hold that a house is a product and apply strict liability
to any damaging event resulting therefrom is surpassing the initial intent of
the Restatement.88 Specifically, buyers of homes were not within the class
78. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1969);
Cross & Murray, supra note 71, at 706.

79. See Schipper, 207 A.2d at 326 (risk of loss on developer in better economic position
to bear loss); Kriegler, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 753 (developer who created danger in better economic
position to bear loss than injured party); see also Cross & Murray, supra note 71, at 706 (deep

pocket considerations).
80. Cross & Murray, supra note 71, at 706.
81. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 123-24 (Miss. 1966).
82. See supra note 70.
83. See supra note 72.
84. Note, Strict Liability in Tort for Builder-Vendors of Homes, 24 TULsA L.J. 117, 118
(1988) [hereinafter Note, Strict Liability].

85. See id.
86. Id.; accord Milan v. Midland Corp., 282 Ark. 15, 665 S.W.2d 284, 284-85 (1984)

(plaintiff alleged defendants caused motorcycle accident by designing street with too sharp a
curve).
87. Note, Strict Liability, supra note 84, at 118. Some defenses that would be lost in a
strict liability cause of action include disclaimer of implied warranties, lack of reliance on
warranties, failure to notify defendant of breach of warranty, and lack of privity. See 63 Ams.
JUR. 2D Products Liability § 528 (1984).

88. See, e.g., Chandler v. Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 569 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1977). The court in

650

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:635

of individuals that section 402A was designed to protect. 9 To hold otherwise
violates the separation of powers doctrine in the Constitution." Because
legislatures, not courts, are the proper forums to extend a new concept of
liability, a court shDuld never decide that a house is a product in order to
extend the concept of strict liability to an allegedly defective structure.
Both sides of this argument claim respectable authority for their positions.9' What is interesting, however, is how a simple word like "product"
can conjure so many meanings. In some jurisdictions, it includes houses
which were traditionally thought of as real property and therefore immune
from section 402A. Alternatively, several jurisdictions hold that items which
are personal property are not products within the scope of section 402A.
IV. Blood
92
Unlike the discussion of sales and services or real estate transactions,
the applicability of the term "product" has been clearly established in the
area involving blood. Forty-nine jurisdictions have enacted what can be
collectively called "blood shield" statutes. 9 These statutes provide that such

Chandler stated that "the imposition of strict liability is the response to some demonstrated
public need where the traditional legal theories have been found inadequate to the task." Id.
89, See id.; see alo Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179, 118283 (Ct. App. 1972) (easier for buyer to make "meaningful inspection" of structure); Chapman
v. Lily Cache Builders, 448 Ill. App. 3d 919, 362 N.E.2d 811, 813 (1977) (difference between

manufacturer of homes and manufacturer of goods).
90. See Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664, 66566 (Ct. App. 1977) (court refused to allow strict liability cause of action in deference to state
statute).
91. See supra notes 70, 72.

92. See supra notes 13-91 and accompanying text.
93. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-314 (1984) (providing blood is service); ALAsKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e)
(1986) (hospital provides blood as service not sale); AiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481 (1986)
(nonprofit blood bank cannot be strictly liable); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-802 (1987) (blood
provider liable for negligence or wilful misconduct only); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606
(Deering 1990) (blood transfusion by law is service not sale); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-104
(2) (1974) (providing blood constitutes service); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986)
(blood is service not sade); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2-316(5) (1975) (blood is service not sale);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-314 (1990) (against public policy to hold blood bank strictly liable);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.3,16(5) (West 1991) (providing blood is rendition of medical services);
GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-316(5) (1982) (providing blood is medical service); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 325-91 (1985) (no implied warranty that blood is pure where no scientific test to detect
disease is available); IDAHo CODE § 39-3702 (1985) (providing blood is service except if sold
for profit); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 para. 5102(2) (Smith-Hurd 1988) (strict tort liability
not applicable to blood providers); IND. CODE AN. § 16-8-7-2 (West 1990) (procurement of
blood is a medical service which does not give rise to strict liability); IOWA CODE ANN. §
142A.8 (West 1989) (providing blood is service not sale and strict liability not applicable);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985) (providing blood is rendition of service and not liability
unless negligence proven); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (processing and distribution of blood deemed service not sale); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2322.1
(West Supp. 1991) (strict liability not applicable to nonprofit blood providers); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (Supp. 1990) (providing blood is service regardless of whether any
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transactions are the rendering of a service or provide explicitly 4 and/or

implicitly" that strict liability shall not apply. Only one jurisdiction, New
Jersey, might allow a strict liability action against a hospital or blood bank
for damages arising out of a blood transfusion.9 6 This liberal view follows

remuneration is paid); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1990) (supplier of blood
performs service and is not subject to strict liability); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-314
(Law. Co-Op. 1984) (annotation number seven surveys numerous other jurisdictions where
blood suppliers are exempt from strict liability); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (9121) (Callaghan
Supp. 1990) (providing blood is service regardless of profit); MimN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-315
(West 1966); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132
N.W.2d 805, 810 (1965) (interprets statute to mean blood supplier provides service and thus
strict liability inapplicable); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-314 (1981) (judicial decision section seven
annotates cases from other jurisdictions holding blood transfusion as service not sale); Mo.
STAT. ANN. § 431.069 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (procurement of blood rendition of medical service);
MONT. CODE AN. § 50-33-102 (1989) (furnishing blood not sale of product); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-4001 (1990) (furnishment of blood constitutes medical service); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §
460.010 (Michie 1987) (no liability for providing blood other than negligence or willful
misconduct); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (1983) (no strict liability regarding blood
products); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (1986) (no liability for blood processing other than
negligence or willful misconduct); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 580(4) (McKinney 1990) (blood
is service); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-410 (1989) (blood is service not sale); N.D. CENr. CODE
§ 43-17-40 (1978) (no liability for blood except for negligence); Osno REv. CODE ANN. §
2108.11 (Baldwin 1989) (sale of blood constitutes service not sale); 61 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
2151 (West 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 97.300 (1987) (sale of blood not sales transaction covered
by implied warranty); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8333 (Purdon 1982) (no strict liability for
blood transfusion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-30 (1989) (no liability for blood transfusion other
than negligence or willful misconduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-33-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (sale
of blood is medical service as matter of law); S.D. CODIRED LAws ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988)
(blood is medical service); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979) (implied warranty of
merchantability not applicable to sale of blood); TEx. Crv. PRAc. & Rm. CODE ANN. § 77.003
(Vernon 1986) (person not liable for blood transfusion except for negligence, gross negligence
or intentional tort); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1989) (person participating in sale of blood
providing service); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (1985) (no action for implied warranty in
connection with transfer of blood or human tissue); WAsH. REv. CODE AN. § 70.54.120
(1975) (limiting liability of blood supplier to negligent or willful conduct except where fee
paid, then strict liability possible); W. VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1991) (procurement of human
blood declared not to be sale); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31 (West 1989) (blood transfer constitutes
service, liability for negligence and willful misconduct only); Wyo. STAT. § 34.1-2-316(c)(iv)
(1990) (dispensing blood constitutes medical service not sale). No statute on limiting the liability
for blood providers could be located in the jurisdiction of Vermont.
94. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481 (1986) (nonprofit blood bank cannot be strictly
liable); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 5102(2) (Smith-Hurd 1988) (strict tort liability not
applicable to blood providers); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (West 1990) (procurement of blood
is a medical service which does not give rise to strict liability). These statutes, along with many
others, expressly state that blood provider cannot be held strictly liable.
95. E.g., ARuK. Code Ann. § 20-9-802 (1987) (blood provider liable for negligence or willful
misconduct only); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985) (providing blood is rendition of service
and no liability unless negligence proven); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.010 (Michie 1987) (no
liability for providing blood other than negligence or willful misconduct). The wording of these
types of statutes implies that strict liability is not an available remedy because the statutes only
permit a cause of action for negligence or willful misconduct.
96. See Note, New Jersey Court Applies Theory of Strict Liability to Hospitals and Blood
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from New Jersey's interpretation that strict liability is an available remedy
against a service provider.9 Therefore, in most jurisdictions, blood is not
considered the equivalent of a product under section 402A of the Restatement.98
V. Electricity
"What is electricity? Simply stated, it is a force, like the wind
. "9
Is it a product? The answer to this question, as in those cases involving

Banks for Transfusion-Related Hepatitis - Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 121 N.J. Super. 299,
296 A.2d 668 (L. Div. 1972), 4 SEroN HALL L. REV. 730, 730 (1973); see also Pollock, Liability
of a Blood Bank or Hospitalfor a HepatitisAssociated Transfusion in New Jersey, 2 SEaoN
HALL L. REv. 47, 47 (1970). The Brody case was reversed on appeal on the basis that no
reliable method existed for detecting a virus in blood. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J.
Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392, 392 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
97. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 n.3
(1985) (holding that ele,.tricity is product under § 402A). Electricity has been defined as "a
form of energy that can be made or produced by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and
distributed to be used a,;
an energy source for heat, power, and light and is distributed in the
stream of commerce." Itansome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d
641, 643 (1979).
In Pierce, a home coAsumer of electricity was injured due to the mechanical failure of a
transformer that sent 7C0 volts of electricity into her home. Pierce, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
The court noted: "Electricity alone cannot perform work. Electricity alone is useless from a
consumer's point of view. Electricity is a stream of electrons that is created, transmitted,
distributed, and converted to energy all within milliseconds. No California court has ever held
that electricity is a prodact." Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 288 n.3. In this case, a California court
for the first time held that Pacific Gas & Electric as a commercial supplier of electricity could
be held strictly liable for personal injuries. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The basis of the court's
decision was the numerous policy considerations underlying the imposition of strict liability.
Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291. These policy considerations include:
1. That the defendant is in a much better position than a plaintiff to detect
and correct any problems which inevitably occur in electrical supply.
2. The imposition of strict liability creates an incentive for defendants to avoid
accidents before they occur by investing in safer equipment.
3. Imposing strict liability spreads the costs of personal injuries among millions
of electricity consumers.
4. The defendant who profited from the sale of blectricity should assume the
associated costs involved.
Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. The Pierce court was clear to distinguish the facts in their case
from a situation involving injuries initiated by an act of god. The court noted that:
Where electricity strikes a powerline and enters a consumer's home, causing
damage, the utility is not strictly liable because it has not marketed a "product"
at all. In such cases the utility has provided only a connecting medium through
which the force of nature enters the consumer's home and causes injury.
Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292 n.10. A judicial response to the aforementioned policy considerations
justifying holding an electrical power company strictly liable was espoused by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Fergu~on v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190
(1976). In Ferguson, the court stated that while "spreading the cost of serious injury over all
consumers of electricity i5 equitably more appealing ... the court is persuaded by the amicus
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blood,10 depends upon the jurisdiction involved. In determining whether
electricity is a product, courts have been much more creative in determining
their particular position. For example, some courts hold that electricity is
a service to which only the action of negligence is applicable. 0' These
jurisdictions view electricity as a commodity which can not be packaged,
labeled, and sold and, therefore, is not a fungible good. By definition, then,
electricity is a service. 0 2 Other courts maintain that even though electricity
constitutes a service, non-code implied warranties still apply. 03 The court
in one case held that because other states applied implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability to service transactions, electricity should not be
excluded from these warranties.'0 4

briefs which detail the severe economic consequences which may be sustained by the many
small electric utilities by the abrupt imposition of such a rule." Id., 239 N.W.2d at 194. The
Ferguson court continued by calling on the state legislature to resolve this economic problem.

Id.
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Mosby v. Southwestern Elec. Co., 659 F.2d 680, 681 (5th Cir. Oct. 1981)

(plaintiff must prove electric company negligent for not reasonably anticipating injury); Rice
v. Florida Power &Light Co., 363 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (electric company
should be held to reasonableness standard); Ford v. Georgia
261 S.E.2d 474, 474 (Ct. App. 1979) (summary judgment
negligence shown); Hedges v. Public Serv. Co., 396 N.E.2d
(power company not strictly liable for injuries resulting from

Power Co., 151 Ga. App. 748,
granted because no actionable
933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
contact with high-voltage trans-

mission wire); Williams v. Detroit Power Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702, 709 (1975)
(power company held to reasonable man standard); Vieths v. Ripley, 295 N.W.2d 659, 663
(Minn. 1980) (no absolute liability for electric company, plaintiff must show absence of care);
Donovan v. Union Elec. Co., 454 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (electric company's
liability determined upon negligence principles); Rodgers v. Chimney Rock Pub. Power Dist.,
216 Neb. 666, 345 N.W.2d 12, 16 (1984) (power company is not insurer and not liable for
damages unless negligence proved); Wood v. Public Serv. Co., 114 N.H. 182, 317 A.2d 576,

577 (1974) (company engaged in electric current distribution must exercise due care in maintenance of power lines); Bogie v. Duke Power Co., 27 N.C. App. 318, 219 S.E.2d 308, 310
(1975) (electric companies must exercise reasonable care); Bates v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 171 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (companies that maintain electrical wires
cannot anticipate every possible peril); Wray v. Benton Co. Pub. Util. Dist., 9 Wash. App.
456, 513 P.2d 99, 100 (1973) (electric company subject to common law standard of care). See
generally Annotation, Product Liability: Electricity, 60 A.L.R. 4T 732, 749 (1988) (detailing
cases from various jurisdictions holding power companies not subject to strict liability).
102. See, e.g., Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196
N.W.2d 316, 318 (1972) (electricity is service, not goods); Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Co., 81 A.D.2d 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646 (App. Div. 1981) (cable not packaging for the
electrical current); Navarro City Elec. Coop. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (electrical energy cannot be classified as fungible goods nor can it be packaged).
103. See Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196
N.W.2d 316, 318 (1972). But see Wirth v. Mayrath Indus., 278 N.W.2d 789, 792 (N.D. 1979)
(rejecting Buckeye case and holding that implied warranties do not apply to sale of electricity).
The court in Buckeye held that non-code implied warranties still apply on the sale of electricity
even though electricity is a service rather than a "product" or "good." Buckeye, 196 N.W.2d
at 318.
104. Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 186 N.J. Super. 130, 451 A.2d 976, 978
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). The court notes that many of the cases that have held the liability
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In addition, some courts have held that electricity met the definition of
goods under the Uniform Commercial Code in that it is a thing, existing
and movable, and as such subject to the Code's implied warranties. 105 Other
courts view electricity as a product subject not only to the Uniform Commercial Code but also to the ramifications of section 402A.106 In this last
instance, the courts have taken note of the fact that electricity is a substance
which can be manufactured, distributed, and sold in the same manner as
°7
more tangible goods, and as a result should be considered a product.1
Finally, other jurisdictions have adhered to the position that while electricity
itself may constitute a product for purposes of applying the doctrine of
strict liability, its distribution should be viewed as a service subject to
theories of recovery allocated to that type of transaction. 08
Even before the promulgation of section 402A, some courts held that
electricity constituted a product.2 9 In these instances, much attention was

of electric companies is restricted to a negligence theory applied only to those situations wherein
the electricity was transmitted over high tension wires for ultimate consumption by the public.
Id., 451 A.2d at 979.
105. See Helvey v. Wabash Co. REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608, 609 (Ct. App.
1972) (electricity is personal property subject to ownership and as such it may be stolen);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 28 Ohio Misc. 2d 4, 502 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Mun. Ct.
1986) (electricity in metered amounts is good under UCC); see also Gardiner v. Philadelphia
Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612, 614 (1964) (court applied UCC statute of limitations
in breach of warranty sait against electric company).
106. E.g., Elgin Airport Inn v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 88 I11.App. 3d 477, 410 N.E.2d
620, 624 (App. Ct. 1980) (electricity can be "measured, bought and sold, changed in quantity
or quality, delivered whenever desired" and, therefore, it is product subject to strict liability);
Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Wis. 1979)
(strict liability available remedy against electric company).
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
108. See Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo. 1987) (electricity
not a product until it. reaches place where it is consumable); Carbone v. Connecticut Light &
Power Co., 40 Conn. Supp. 120, 482 A.2d 722, 723 (Super. Ct. 1984) (electricity may be
product, but supply of product is service); Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 I11.2d 466, 343
N.E.2d 465, 470 (1976) (power wires not packaging for electricity); Ransome v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1979) (distribution of electricity is
service while electricity itself is consumable product); see also Annotation, Product Liability:
Electricity, 60 A.L.R. 4-e 732, 742-43 (1988).
109. See State v. Interstate Power Co., 118 Neb. 756, 226 N.W. 427, 433 (1929) (electricity
is type of commodity); see also Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., 1 Cal.
App. 511, 82 P. 562, 56 (1905) (defendant contracted to sell energy in which it had ownership
as personal property); Seaton Mountain Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Idaho Spring Inv.
Co., 49 Colo. 122, 111 P. 834, 835 (1910) (describing heating agents such as water and steam
as merchantable products). In Interstate Power Co., the court refused to recognize "raw
products" and "manufactured products" as mutually exclusive terms. Interstate Power Co.,
226 N.W. at 433. The defendants proposed that by drawing a distinction between "raw" and
"manufactured" products electricity in its "raw" form should not be deemed a product. Id.
The court, however, stated that a "'product' is defined by authoritative lexicographers as a
thing produced by nature or the natural processes; that which is produced by an action,
operation or work; a production; the results; that which results from operation of a cause,
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given to the fact that electricity could be produced, stored, measured, moved,
or transported from one place to another and bought and sold by a definite
and well-understood standard." 0 Under these circumstances, it was logical
to consider electricity in terms of a modern-day commodity."' Since 1965,
however, in deciding the issue of whether or not electricity constituted a
product, much attention has been given to the policy reasons for imposing
strict liability.
These policy reasons include the fact that section 402A was adopted to
make it easier for an injured individual to recover." 2 Section 402A is
plaintiff-oriented"' and better suited to a situation involving electricity where
the vast and complex nature of an electrical power plant may be beyond
the ken of the ordinary layman. In other words, even though negligence
may be present, it may not be readily apparent. Therefore, strict liability
should apply, and since it applies only to "products," electricity should be
considered as such.
The second reason for imposing strict liability is that it provides an
incentive for improved product safety." 4 If individuals or corporations know
that they will have to pay if one of their defective products causes injury,
they will attempt to avoid such damaging events in the future. Electricity
is subject to improved handling, and, therefore, section 402A should apply."15 Finally, strict liability reallocates resources. Stated differently, by
imposing strict liability the risk of loss may be spread among all individuals

consequence, or effect."
Id.
The court continued by establishing electricity as a commodity. The court explained that
in the language of everyday life in the strictly commercial sense of the term,
"electricity" is "produced," "stored," "measured," "bought and sold." It is
moved or transported from place to place in containers or by cable. It is something
that one trades or deals in. We buy it and pay for it and determine the amount
of the purchases by a definite and well-understood "standard." Brought into
being as a product, it exists in modem life as a commodity.
Id.
110. State v. Interstate Power Co., 118 Neb. 756, 226 N.W. 427, 433 (1929).
111. Id.
112. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & -Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 291
(1985). According to the court, one of the main policy grounds for applying strict liability to
electricity is to provide "a short-cut to liability where negligence may be present but is difficult
to prove." Id. The court stated:
Proof of negligence in cases such as this requires a plaintiff to present to a jury
evidence of the inner workings of an electrical power system of vast and complex
proportions. The technical operation of such systems and of electricity itself is
far beyond the knowledge of the average juror. The expert witnesses who can
explain such systems to the jury are concentrated within the industry itself and
may be reluctant to serve as expert witnesses in plaintiffs' cases.

Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92.
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using the product instead of a few blameless victims."16 This is especially
true in situations involving electricity where the cost of tort liability would
be spread among millions of consumers." 7 Because the basic policy reasons
for imposing strict liability are present, it should apply even though it
requires designating a "force like the wind""' as a product.
VI.

Other Situations Where the Term "Product" Has Been Applied

The following cases illustrate the way in which ingenious advocates and
willing courts have joined together and expanded the meaning of the term
"product." Other than showing how exaggerated the meaning of a word
can become, no clear consensus of the meaning of the term has emerged.
For example, even though section 402A is silent on the subject of component
parts, a majority of the jurisdictions have held that component parts may
be considered products and that their manufacturers can be held strictly
liable." 9 The only caveat to this rule is that the component part, even though
incorporated into and part of another object, must reach the consuming
public without substantial change. 20 This apparently means that if the
component part is capable of being identified as a separate and individual
entity of the total integral finished object, such as a windshield in an
automobile, then it is a product.' 2 If the component part is no longer
distinguishable or capable of being identified on its own, it loses its status
as a product. The courts thus far have differed as to how much change
must take place in order for this transformation to take place. '"
In addition, it has been held that when a commodity such as water is
sold by a city and distributed by a water works system, it is a product, and
if defective, the city is subject to strict liability.'2 In a situation where the
water coming out of a kitchen tap had been intermingled with a flammable
gas that was ignited by the plaintiff's cigarette, the court reasoned that the
case was analogous to those cases in which food products had been contaminated by substances such as glass, rocks, or pieces of metal.2 4 As a
result, the court concluded that the product was defective and unreasonably
dangerous,'1 5 and the city was subject to strict liability
even though the
26
injury did not occur as a result of drinking water.
116. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
119. Night, Products Liability: Component Part Manufacturer'sLiability for Design and
Warning Defects, 54 3. Am L. & COM. 215, 226 (1988).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 227.
123. Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
124. Id. at '589; see also Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138, 140 (5th
Cir. 1959).
125. Moody, 524 S.W.2d at 589.
126. Id.
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Decisions which will have a lasting effect well into the next century are

those involving computer software. In this day of advanced technology when
complex activities such as diagnosing medical problems, 127 monitoring industrial robots, 28 determining architectural stress,2 9 directing automatic airplane pilots, 3 0 and supervising chemical or nuclear plants' 3 ' are all
accomplished by giant, massive, and complex computers, some courts may
hold that the software which guide them are products. The fact that the

software can be owned, adjusted, repaired, and,
in some cases, altered
32
makes them resemble any other fungible goods.
Finally, the most recent genre of cases to expand upon the meaning of
the term "product" are those dealing with what can best be described as
defective ideas. Examples of this type of case include erroneous information
in a manual containing instructions for the operation and maintenance of
a radial saw,3 3 as well as erroneous information in an aircraft instrument
approach chart. 134 In both cases, the court held that the falsity of information constituted a defective product. 3 ' In the aircraft approach situation,
the court reasoned that because the chart was mass-produced, 36 the defendant fit into the traditional mold of an individual who could bear the cost
127. See Lawrence, Strict Liability Computer Software and Medicine: Public Policy at the
Crossroads, 23 TORT INS. L.J. 1, 9 (1987); Tort Liabilityfor High Risk Computer Software
at 375-76; see also Neuman, Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems, SoFrwARE
ENGINEERING NOTES, July 1987, at 7; Software Bugs: A Matter of Life and Liability, DATAMATION, May 15, 1987, at 88.
128. Neuman, supra note 127, at 7.
129. Id.; see also Building Made Easy: Computer-Aided Design and Drafting (CADD)
Systems Are Fueling a Revolution in the Architectural Field, SKY, Feb. 1987, at 21.
130. Neuman, supra note 127, at 7-8; see also CPU Fails, Two Jets Nearly Collide,
COMPUTERWORLD, July 9, 1979, at I.
131. Neuman, supra note 127, at 2. See generally Computer Error Closes Nuke Plants,
INDIANAN POLISSTAR, Mar. 16, 1979, at 1.
132. Lawrence, supra note 127, at 9; see also RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc. 772 F.2d 543,
546 (9th Cir. 1985).
133. Comment, Strict Liabilityfor Defective Ideas in Publications,42 VAND. L. REv. 557,
567 (1989); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Employer's Ins. of Wausau, 585 F. Supp. 739,
745 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In this case, the insurance company claimed they were not required to
defend Sears because the insurance applied to the manual itself and not the words described
within the manual. Sears, 585 F. Supp. at 745. The court held, however, that this was not a
valid argument. Id. The court did acknowledge that a products liability action for "defective
ideas" within the manual was inappropriate. Id.
134. Comment, supra note 133, at 570. In Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.,
642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1981), the court held that § 402A applied to aircraft instrument
approach charts. In this case, the survivors of a plane crash claimed that the defective chart
caused the crash. Id.
In Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 783 (D. Conn. 1982), a small aircraft
crashed while attempting a full instrument landing. In applying strict liability the court explained
that the numerous policy justifications for imposing strict liability applied to the charts. Id.
at 790-91. This case was later followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brocklesby
v. United States, 753 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
135. Comment, supra note 133, at 570-72.
136. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 783, 790-91 (D. Conn. 1982).
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of strict liability. This burden could be accomplished by distributing the
risk of injury through insurance and higher prices spread out among the
entire production, which was preferable to having the cost of injury borne
by the individual injured plaintiff. It should be noted, however, that these
cases have not been widely followed. In fact, more often than not, analogous
fact situations have produced the opposite conclusion. For example, courts
have held that credit reports, 37 a magazine article dealing with autoerotic
asphyxiation, 38 a science experiment in a text book,'3 9 a recipe in a cook
book,'14 as well as the lyrics in a song which allegedly influenced a teenager
to commit suicide,"' are not products. In all of these cases the courts,
stressing the importance of the first amendment, took a strong
position
42
against imposing strict liability upon the expression of ideas. 1
The cases cited above, however, should be taken into consideration when
determining the emerging meaning of the term "product." The fact that
such allegations have been made is indicative of the current thought. It also
shows that inroads into the further expansion of the term "product" are
43
being made. Once a new idea has been expressed in a dissenting opinion,
44
it is sometimes only a matter of time before a new cause of action emerges.
VII.

Conclusion

This article illustrates how far courts have come in interpreting the term
"product" in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Courts
have generally avoided the dictionary's definition and have instead utilized
a strict liability policy approach in the interpretation of the term.' 4 This
has led to some unusual results. Today, transactions involving traditional
137. Comment, supra note 133, at 569; see also L. Cohen & Co. v. Dunn & Bradstreet,
Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (D. Conn. 1986).
138. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983), modeled on
other grounds, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). In this case,
the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death suit against Hustler magazine alleging that an article
on autoerotic asphyxiation was an unreasonably dangerous and defective product which caused
the death of the plaintiff's son and brother. The two men were attempting to duplicate the
sexual technique described in the magazine, which was intended to increase erotic pleasure
during masturbation.
139. Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modyfied
on other grounds, 88 A.D.2d 787, 451 N.Y.S. 533 (App. Div. 1982). In this case a child
suffered injuries after attempting to duplicate an experiment involving a ruler and rubber
bands. The court rejected the strict liability claim on the basis that the plaintiff "was not
injured by use of the book for the purpose for which it was designed, i.e., to be read." Id.,
439 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
140. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The court concluded
that -strict liability did not apply to the recipe ideas contained within the book. Id.
141. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (1988).
142. Id.
143. Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mountain, Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App. 437, 245 N.W.2d 81,
83 (1976). In the dissenting opinion Presiding Judge Burns stated that "the painter's 'product',
if there must be one, is the performance of his work." Id.
144. See, e.g., Cantu, Privacy, 7 ST. Louis U. Pua. L. REv. 313, 322 (1988).
145. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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services, houses, land, blood, electricity, component parts, water, computer
software, and ideas have all been held in one form or another to constitute
a product. How much further will we go? The answer to this question
depends on the ingenuity of plaintiffs and the willingness of courts to extend
the protection of section 402A to individuals injured by a commodity placed
into the stream of commerce. The trend thus far has been to extend the
meaning of the term beyond that originally contemplated in 1965 when
section 402A was promulgated. This movement has met with little resistance
as the courts have reached far in attempting to cloak injured plaintiffs with
the protection offered by the concept of strict liability.

